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As difficult as it may be to believe after almost nine years of war in Afghanistan, at some 
point that war will be over.  It is unlikely that President Obama will bring our troops 
home by his summer 2011 deadline, and even more unlikely that victory, whatever that 
means now, will be achieved in Afghanistan.  It is, however, almost apparent that at some 
point we will have to wind down the war.  This may come following some modest gains 
there, on the heels of a victory declaration or after a humiliating defeat, but it will happen 
eventually. 
The lessons which the U.S. learns from Afghanistan will frame foreign policy for the 
decades to come, but it is not at all clear what all those lessons will be.  Some of these 
lessons, that the U.S. cannot easily bring any country it chooses into the modern 
democratic world, that we should not lay our trust in leaders as erratic, undependable and 
corrupt as Hamid Karzai, that winning the peace is far more difficult than winning the 
war and that the conflicts of the 21st century are quite different than those which 
characterized most of the 20th century, are obvious. 
There are other less obvious lessons from the U.S. experience in Afghanistan which are 
worth exploring as well.  The first is that, perhaps more than ever, we live in an inter-
connected world.  The war in Afghanistan has influenced U.S. relations with Russia, 
countries of Central Asia, much of the rest of the former Soviet Union, NATO and 
elsewhere.  The need for secure transit routes to Afghanistan has made the U.S. 
dependent on Central Asian despots and made good relations with Russia 
imperative.  This has also made it necessary for the U.S. to move away from its 
commitment to democracy in the region and it more difficult for the U.S. to be a powerful 
counterweight to Russian influence and power. 
A big picture lesson from Afghanistan is that when crafting foreign policy what is 
possible should probably play a bigger role in decision making than what is ideal or even 
what is right.  There is clearly room for ethics and human rights in foreign policy, but it 
needs to be tempered by a more sober understanding of the limits of American 
power.  Helping Afghanistan become a modern, democratic, free country was not a bad 
goal, but it was never going to be achieved absent an exponentially larger and more 
expensive U.S. effort-an effort which may not have been politically possible. 
Afghanistan also exposed the division in the U.S. between the military and the rest of 
society.  The assertion that in both Iraq and Afghanistan it is the American military, not 
the U.S. more broadly that is at war, has become something of a cliché, but it remains 
true.  Over time, this will have an impact on the U.S. as those who fight our wars become 
increasingly isolated from those who do not.  This may increase the challenges veterans 
have when returning to civilian life as well as make those Americans with no ties to the 
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military more callous about sending people into harm’s way.  Additionally, the wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq have put tremendous stress on the U.S. military and demonstrated 
the limits recruitment strategies.  This is another constraint which will frame future 
foreign policy. 
The war in Afghanistan has had a complex impact on national security and the war on 
terror.  Although American casualties continue to mount in Afghanistan, it remains true 
that since the war began there have been no terrorist attacks on American soil.  This is not 
because the terrorist threat no longer exists, because it does. Nor is it because the war has 
sufficiently disrupted terrorist networks in Afghanistan, because it hasn’t. Instead, the 
war effort in Afghanistan has been part of a range of security efforts both domestic and 
foreign that have helped keep America safe.  This is somewhat counter intuitive because 
the war is not broadly seen as a success.  Attacks on our troops are common; Osama Bin 
Laden has not been found; and the Taliban is, at least according to some measures, 
becoming stronger in that region. None of this has been enough to contribute to another 
attack on American soil. 
How this impact is explained will be very central to the legacy of the Afghan war.  One 
interpretation would be to see this costly and seemingly endless war as having been 
essential to our security since September 11th.  Another interpretation would be that the 
war in Afghanistan was essentially spurious, coinciding with almost a decade following 
September 11th when there were no attacks on the U.S.  Neither of these interpretations 
are meaningfully accurate and both would lead to wrongheaded foreign policy 
decisions.  Synthesizing these two interpretations, both of which contain important 
elements of truth will be the challenge facing future American administrations. 
